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Abstract  
 
In this study, we examine how insurance affects income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa, 
using data from 42 countries during the period 2004-2014. Three inequality variables are 
used, namely: the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. Two insurance 
premiums are employed, namely: life insurance and non-life insurance. The empirical 
evidence is based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Life insurance increases 
the Gini coefficient and increasing life insurance has a net positive effect on the Gini 
coefficient and the Atkinson index. Non-life insurance reduces the Gini coefficient and 
increasing non-life insurance has a net positive effect on the Palma ratio. The analysis is 
extended to establish policy thresholds at which increasing insurance premiums completely 
dampen the net positive effects. From the extended analysis, 7.500 of  life insurance 
premiums (% of GDP) is the critical mass required for life insurance to negatively affect 
inequality, while 0.855 of non-life insurance premiums (% of GDP) is the threshold required 
for non-life insurance to negatively affect inequality. Policy thresholds are provided at which 
insurance penetration decreases income inequality in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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1. Introduction 
The motivation for assessing the relevance of insurance on inequality in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) is threefold, notably: (1) growing exclusive development and challenges to the post-
2015 development agenda; (2) the potential for insurance penetration on the continent; and (3) 
gaps in the literature. Elements of the motivation are expanded in the same order as they are 
highlighted. 
 First, in the light of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) pertaining to inequality, 
the recent evidence of growing exclusive development in Africa represents a policy syndrome 
in the global challenge of reducing inequality and promoting shared economic prosperity2. In 
essence, inequality is crucial in the objective of enhancing shared economic development for 
the attainment of most goals enshrined in the post-2015 development agenda. For instance, in 
order to curtail extreme poverty to a below 3% threshold by 2030, inequality has to be 
mitigated because the response of extreme poverty to growth decreases with growing levels of 
inequality (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). It has become apparent that inequality in SSA 
represents a very challenging policy syndrome if most inequality-related SDGs are to be 
achieved for the continent. The foundations of this assertion are threefold: (1) the established 
evidence that the response of poverty to growth is a negative function of inequality (Fosu, 
2015); (2) Africa has been enjoying more than two decades of growth resurgence (Tchamyou, 
2019, 2020); and (3) about 50% of African countries did not attain the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (Asongu & le Roux, 2019).   
 Two main insights from the above account merit critical examination. On the one 
hand, the fact that the numerical value of the population still living in extreme poverty has 
consistently increased in Africa is clear evidence that the economic prosperity has not largely 
benefited the poor segments of the population. The role of inequality in decreasing the effect 
of economic growth on poverty reduction can explain why poverty levels in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are still high despite the recent two decades of economic growth resurgence. Hence, 
with consideration to the importance of inequality in poverty-growth relationship: “Output 
may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer” (Lewis, 1955). On 
the other hand, even in a scenario where 2000-2010 growth levels are maintained in order to 
achieve the SDGs poverty targets as argued by a stream of the literature (Ravallion, 2013), 
inequality will need to be dealt with in order to avoid growing extreme poverty and slowing 
                                                          
2Policy syndrome within the framework of this study is inequality. This conception and understanding of a 
policy syndrome is consistent with recent inclusive development (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) and inequality 
(Tchamyou et al., 2019a) literature.   
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down of economic prosperity (Chandy et al., 2013; Yoshida et al., 2014). The contemporary 
relevance of addressing inequality in order to achieve most 2030 targets for Africa is 
consistent with the conclusions of Bicaba et al. (2017): “This paper examines its feasibility for 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that under 
plausible assumptions extreme poverty will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be 
reduced to low levels through high growth and income redistribution towards the poor 
segments of the society” (p. 93). This assertion on Sub-Saharan Africa is relevant to North 
African countries (Ncube et al., 2014). The purpose of this research is to assess how the 
policy syndrome of inequality can be addressed with enhanced insurance penetration.  
 Second, a high potential for insurance penetration in Africa represents a policy 
instrument with which some macroeconomic and human development outcomes can be 
achieved. As maintained by Kyerematen (2015), the penetration of insurance in Africa is 
substantially low relative to other regions of the world. The author supports the perspective by 
articulating that, with the exception of South Africa, only about 5% of the population in 
Africa has access to insurance services. Enhanced insurance penetration can potentially 
reduce inequality because as recently documented by the OECD (2017), insurance policies 
that are complemented with simplified claims and wide coverage can improve access to 
financial protection for hitherto underserved segments of society. Unfortunately, the extant 
literature has failed to examine the relevance of enhancing insurance in the development of 
poor segments of society in Africa. 
 Third, as expanded in section 2, the bulk of the literature on insurance penetration in 
Africa has focused on two main strands, notably:  (1) connections between insurance 
penetration and development outcomes (Ioncică et al., 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan & 
Biekpe, 2015, 2016a; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020a); and (2) determinants of insurance 
penetration (Zerriaa et al., 2017; Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016b; 
Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020b). This research extends the former strand of the literature by 
investigating the relevance of enhancing insurance on inequality because of an apparent gap 
in the inequality literature. Accordingly, the contemporary inequality literature on Africa has 
focused  on inter alia: the nexuses between finance, education and inequality (Meniago & 
Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020); the reinvention of foreign aid for inclusive 
development (Page & Söderbom, 2015; Jones & Tarp, 2015; Asongu, 2016); the relationships 
between inequality and corruption (Sulemana & Kpienbaareh, 2018); the nexuses between 
income, consumption and wealth of poor segments of society (De Magalhães & Santaeulàlia-
5 
 
Llopis, 2018);  and the connection between inequality and foreign investment (Kaulihowa & 
Adjasi, 2018). 
 We fully understand the risk involved in doing measurement without firmly 
established theoretical underpinnings. However, we also argue that applied econometrics 
should not exclusively be contingent on the rejection and acceptance of established theoretical 
models. According to the study, applied econometrics, even in the absence of a formal 
theoretical framework, is a useful scientific research because the findings could provide the 
basis for theoretical-building. This argument is in accordance with the attendant literature on 
the relevance of applied econometrics in academic and policy-making circles (Costantini & 
Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The intuition for the 
connection between insurance and inequality is based on the perspective that insurance 
provides leverage against negative household and economic shocks, which can substantially 
diminish the quality of wellbeing and livelihood. Furthermore, like inflation, this negative 
shock is more likely to be unfavorably borne by poorer factions of the population, compared 
to their rich counterparts. Accordingly, improved access to insurance services has the prospect 
of reducing inequality because it offers financial protection to all segments of society, 
including the previously underserved categories (OECD, 2017). 
The above intuition motivating the study is assessed using a panel of 42 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings of the study reveal that life insurance has a positive impact 
on the Gini coefficient whereas increasing life insurances engenders a net positive impact on 
both the Atkinson index and the Gini coefficient. While non-life insurance mitigates the Gini 
coefficient, the incidence of increasing non-life insurance on the Palma ratio is positive. An 
extended analysis is performed to establish policy-relevant thresholds of insurance at which 
the established positive net impacts on inequality are nullified. From the extended analysis, it 
is established that: (i) 7.500 of life insurance premium (% of GDP) is the threshold needed for 
life insurance to influence inequality negatively and (ii) 0.855 of non-life insurance premium 
(% of GDP) is the threshold required for non-life insurance to impact inequality negatively in 
the sampled countries.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the extant 
literature while the data and methodology are discussed in section 3. Section 4 discloses the 
empirical results whereas section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
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2. Literature review  
 Consistent with the highlighted literature in the introduction, the extant contemporary 
literature on insurance in Africa (which has not focused on the nexus between inequality and 
insurance) can be discussed in two main strands3. One has focused on the determinants of life 
insurance in the continent, while the other has been concerned with linkages between 
insurance penetration and development outcomes.  
 In the first strand on determinants of insurance penetration, Guerineau and Sawadogo 
(2015) assess drivers of life insurance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with focus on twenty 
countries in SSA and data for the period 1996-2011. The empirical strategy adopted by the 
authors (i.e. an instrumental variable technique) enables them to account for potential issues 
of endogeneity. The findings show a positive relationship between income per capita and life 
insurance premium. The improvement of life insurance schemes is negatively linked with 
young dependency and life expectancy ratios whereas the following determinants are 
positively associated with life insurance, namely: government stability, old dependency ratio 
and the protection of property. The study also maintains that life insurance is still viewed as a 
luxury commodity in the sub-region. 
 Motivations for the demand for life insurance have also been investigated by Zerriaa et 
al. (2017). Focusing on Tunisia using annual data for the period 1990-2014, the authors find 
that inflation and interest rates do not significantly determine the outcome variable. 
Conversely, pension expenditures have a negative effect whereas life expectancy, 
dependency, urbanization, income and financial development positively drive life insurance.  
Characteristics that are convenient for the development of life insurance are assessed 
by Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b) in thirty-one African countries for the period 1996-2010. 
The corresponding findings reveal that relative to financial determinants, demographic factors 
are associated with a higher explanatory power. In addition, the findings also reveal that life 
insurance consumption is diminished by dependency, inflation and life expectancy while 
positive associations are apparent from the following determinants: institutional quality, 
financial development and health expenditure.   
In the second strand, the causal linkage between insurance and economic prosperity 
has been examined by Akinlo (2015) in a sample of thirty countries in SSA over the period 
                                                          
3The papers engaged in this section do not specifically deal with inequality. The purpose of the section is to 
substantiate the highlighted literature in the introduction. Accordingly, the study is being positioned on 
inequality because of the absence of literature focusing on the nexus between insurance and inequality in Africa.  
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1995-2011. Using a panel heterogeneous causality analytical technique, the findings reveal 
evidence of bidirectional causality between insurance and economic prosperity.  
In another study on the relationship between the penetration of insurance and 
economic development, linkages between efficiency, productivity and scale economies in the 
non-life insurance market are examined by Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) using data from 
South Africa over the period 2007-2012. With logistic, bootstrapped and data envelopment 
analysis, the results show that: approximately 20% of insurers optimally perform their 
operations whereas non-life insurers are associated with about 50% inefficiency. The findings 
reveal that improvements in productivity are contingent on technological ameliorations as 
well as evidence of a non-monotonic impact of size on constant returns to scale and 
efficiency. Furthermore, the findings confirm the relevance of leverage, reinsurance and 
product line diversification in determining constant returns to scale and efficiency.  
 Alhassan and Biekpe (2016a) in another research have examined the nexus between 
economic prosperity and the development of insurance in eight African countries (Algeria, 
Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa) for the period 
1990-2010. Employing an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) empirical strategy; the 
authors establish a long term linkage between economic growth and the insurance market in 
South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco and Mauritius. Moreover, from a vector error 
correction model (VECM) empirical setting, evidence of bidirectional causality is revealed in 
Morocco, mixed findings are apparent for Gabon whereas a unidirectional causality is found 
in Madagascar and Algeria. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study is focused on 42 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2004-
20144. The corresponding temporal and geographical scopes of the study are restricted by 
constraints in data availability at the time of the study. The data come from three main 
sources, notably:  (i) World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank for a control 
variable (i.e. remittances) ; (ii) the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of 
                                                          
4The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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the World Bank for the insurance premiums (i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance) and a 
control variable (i.e. financial depth); (iv) the Global Consumption and Income Project 
(GCIP) for the inequality variables (i.e. the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma 
ratio). 
 Consistent with the contemporary literature on inequality, three main inequality 
indicators are adopted by the study (Tchamyou et al., 2019a; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). The 
indicators include: (i) the Gini coefficient which reflects the distribution of wealth across the 
population. However, the main drawback in the indicator is that it fails to capture extreme 
values in the inequality distribution (Naceur & Zhang, 2016). Hence, in order to control for 
tails of the inequality distribution, the Gini coefficient is complemented with two more 
inequality indicators that are designed to capture extreme values of the inequality distribution, 
namely: the Palma ratio and the Atkinson index. (ii) The Atkinson index is an indicator of 
income inequality which measures the percentage of total income that a specific society 
would forego in an attempt to have more income equality among citizens. (iii) The Palma 
ratio denotes national income shares of the top 10% of households to the bottom 40%.  
 All the insurance premiums provided by the FDSD of the World Bank are considered 
in the analysis, notably: life insurance and non-life insurance. The choice of these two 
premiums is also motivated by the engaged literature in section 2 (Ioncică et al., 2012; 
Akinlo, 2015; Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; 
Zerriaa et al., 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020a, 2020b)5. 
 Two control variables are adopted in order to account for variable omission bias, 
namely: remittances and government expenditure.  Variables in the conditioning information 
set are limited to two because a preliminary analysis shows that accounting for more control 
variables generates estimations that fail to pass post-estimation diagnostic tests in the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) results. Accordingly, even when instruments are 
collapsed in the specification process, the involvement of more than two control variables still 
leads to instrument proliferation. The limitation to two control variables is not an issue for the 
robustness of the GMM specifications because there is a strand of the GMM literature that 
                                                          
5The adoption of life and non-life insurance premiums is based on a review of the attendant literature. For 
instance Ioncica (2012), who focuses on the insurance market in Romania, broadly confirms the two types of 
insurance classifications “Formal education is also associated with status and with a demand for security and 
protection of life, health and properties of the individual through insurance” (Ioncica, 2012, p. 4155 ). Hence, 
when reviewing the literature, we are not exclusively concerned with phraseological mentions of the types of 
insurance premiums used in the study. We delve deeper to understand whether the insurance discussion can be 
classified into the life and non-life insurance premiums used in the study. 
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does not employ control variables in order to limit instrument proliferation and avoid 
inefficient estimates (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b).   
 Among the selected control variables, remittances are expected to averagely reduce 
income inequality. However, when the whole distribution of income distribution is 
considered, such that wealthy and less wealthy factions of the population as articulated in the 
modeling exercise, it is likely for remittances to increase inequality. Hence, in the light of the 
definitions, conceptions and measurements of the inequality indicators, remittances can 
reduce the Gini coefficient and have the opposite effect on the Atkinson index and Palma 
ratio. This discourse on the contingency of the effect remittances on the heterogeneity of 
inequality indicators is consistent with the attendant inequality literature. According to 
Anyanwu (2011) and Meniago and Asongu (2018), most of the population remitting funds to 
Africa are from wealthier factions of the African society. This is essentially because those 
migrating abroad are largely from wealthy backgrounds which, have the associated financial 
resources for visa processing and related administrative travel expenses.  
 Financial depth in the perspective of money supply has been established to be pro-
poor in recent African inequality literature (Tchamyou et al., 2019a). The definitions and 
sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the summary statistics is disclosed in 
Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is covered by Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 Consistent with contemporary literature (Asongu & Minkoua, 2018; Zhang et al., 
2019; Li et al., 2014, 2016; Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b), the adopted 
estimation technique is consistent with data behaviour. The GMM estimation approach is 
adopted for four fundamental reasons. First, the number of cross sections (i.e. sampled 
countries) is higher compared to the number of time periods appearing in each cross section. 
Therefore, since 42 (i.e. number of countries) is substantially higher than corresponding 
number of years (i.e. 11 or 2004 to 2014) in each cross section, the adopted estimation 
strategy is appropriate.  It follows that the N(42)>T(11)  condition for the employment of the 
GMM approach is fulfilled. Second, given that persistence is also a condition for the adoption 
of the GMM technique, we explore the nexuses between the identified inequality indicators 
and their first lags to confirm that the corresponding correlations are higher than the rule of 
thumb threshold of 0.800 used to ascertain the persistence of an outcome variable in the 
extant GMM and inequality literature (Tchamyou et al., 2019b). Accordingly, the study finds 
that the corresponding correlations for the Atkinson index, the Palma ratio and the Gini 
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coefficient are respectively, 0.958, 0.964 and 0.918. Third, the panel nature of the data 
structure allows the estimation approach to account for cross-country differences in the 
specifications. Fourth, the concern of endogeneity is addressed from two main perspectives. 
On the one hand, the issue of reverse causality or simultaneity is tackled by using internal 
instruments. On the other hand, by involving time invariant indicators in the conditioning 
information set, the estimation captures the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 In the light of narratives that traditional GMM approaches produce less efficient 
estimated coefficients, this study adopts the  Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) because it has been established to produce more efficient estimates and 
restrict instrument proliferation (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng et al., 2018). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiI , is an inequality indicator (i.e. Gini coefficient, Atkinson index and Palma ratio)  of  
country i in  period t , 0  is a constant, IS  entails insurance  (life insurance and non-life 
insurance), ISIS  denote  quadratic interactions between insurance premiums (“life insurance” 
× “life insurance”, “non-life insurance” × “non-life insurance”),   W  is the vector of control 
variables (remittances and financial depth),
 
represents the coefficient of auto-regression 
which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to capture past 
information, t
 
is the time-specific constant, i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error 
term.  
 Consistent with the attendant literature, the study discusses identification and 
exclusion restrictions properties underpinning the GMM strategy (Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017; Tchamyou et al., 2019). These are essential for robust GMM estimations. All 
explanatory variables are considered as predetermined variables and the years or time 
invariant variables are considered as strictly exogenous, in accordance with recent empirical 
literature, notably: Boateng et al. (2018) and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c). The 
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identification strategy is also supported by Roodman (2009b)6  who has argued that it is 
unfeasible for the time invariant variables to become endogenous after a first difference.  
 In the light of the above identification process, in the empirical results section of this 
study, the exclusion restriction assumption is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Like in the empirical literature  based on the standard 
instrumental variable (IV) approach (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d), a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the over-identifying restrictions test is an indication that the 
strictly exogenous variables or instruments explain the outcome variable beyond the proposed 
channels or endogenous explaining variables. Hence, the validity of the exclusion restriction 
assumption is validated when the null hypothesis of the DHT is not rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
The results are disclosed in this section. While Table 1 focuses on life insurance, Table 2 is 
concerned with non-life insurance. For either table, three specifications are apparent for each 
of the three inequality indicators used in the study. The specifications are tailored such that 
there is a primary non-quadratic specification and a secondary quadratic specification (i.e. 
involving the interaction of insurance premiums).  While the primary specification is meant to 
assess the effect of insurance on inequality, the secondary specification investigates the 
relevance of increasing insurance on inequality. For all specifications, four information 
criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations7. Based on these criteria, all the estimated models are valid. 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
Given that the main objective of this study is linked to the secondary specifications, the 
overall effect of enhancing insurance on inequality is assessed by computing the net effect 
from unconditional and conditional or marginal effects of insurance penetration. For instance 
in the third column of Table 1, the net impact from increasing life insurance is 0.0026 (2×[-
                                                          
6Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
7
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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0.0002× 0.881] + [0.003]).  In the computation, the mean value of life insurance is 0.881, the 
unconditional effect of life insurance is 0.003 while the conditional effect from enhancing life 
insurance is -0.0002. The net impact on the Gini coefficient is robust to the effect on the 
Atkinson index.   
In the same vein, in the last column of Table 2, the net impact from increasing non-life 
insurance is 0.0587 (2×[-0.445× 0.798] + [0.761).  In the computation, the mean value of non-
life insurance is 0.798, the unconditional effect of life insurance is 0.761while the conditional 
effect from enhancing non-life insurance is -0.445. 
 
“Insert Table 2  here” 
 
The following findings can be established in Tables 1-2. Life insurance increases 
inequality (see the Gini coefficient) and increasing life insurance has a net positive effect on 
inequality (see, the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index). Non-life insurance reduces 
inequality (see the Gini coefficient) and increasing non-life insurance has a net positive effect 
on inequality (see the Palma ratio). The significant control variables have the expected signs. 
 
 
4.2 Extension with policy thresholds 
 An extension with threshold analysis is relevant in the perspective that, while the net 
effects are consistently positive on inequality, the corresponding marginal effects used to 
compute the net effects are consistently negative. This implies that, there is a diminishing 
effect on inequality from increasing insurance. It further implies that at a certain threshold of 
insurance penetration, the net effect of increasing insurance penetration on inequality is zero, 
such that above the threshold, increasing insurance has a negative effect on inequality. In 
other words, increasing insurance above the threshold should completely dampen the positive 
unconditional effect of insurance on inequality. However, in order for the thresholds to be 
economically meaningful and policy-relevant, they should be situated within acceptable limits 
disclosed by the summary statistics, notably: between the minimum and maximum limits in 
the corresponding summary statistics.  
 The above conception and definition of threshold are consistent with the attendant 
literature , notably: critical masses at which further carbon dioxide emissions can compromise 
inclusive development (Asongu, 2018); minimum requirements for desired effects (Cummins, 
2000); critical masses for favorable findings (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015) and 
conditions for U-shaped and inverted U-shaped patterns (Ashraf & Galor, 2013).  
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 From Table 1, the negative threshold of life insurance is 7.500 (0.003/ [2×0.0002]). 
Hence, 7.500 of life insurance premium (% of GDP) is the minimum value required for life 
insurance to negatively affect inequality in sampled countries. This threshold makes economic 
sense and has policy relevance because it is within the maximum limit of 12.220 % of life 
insurance imposed by the summary statistics. Policy makers should therefore increase life 
insurance penetration above the computed threshold in order for insurance to reduce 
inequality.  
In the same vein, the negative threshold of non-life insurance is 0.855 (0.761/ 
[2×0.445]). Hence, 0.855 of non-life insurance premium (% of GDP) is the minimum value 
required for non-life insurance to negatively affect inequality in the sampled countries. This 
threshold makes economic sense and has policy relevance because it is within the maximum 
limit of 2.774% of non-life insurance provided in the summary statistics. Policy makers 
should therefore increase non-life insurance penetration above this threshold in order for non-
life insurance to reduce inequality.  
 The findings can be elucidated with the concept informal insurance in the light of 
attendant literature (Ligon et al., 2002; Dupas & Robinson, 2013; De Magalhaes & 
Santaeulalia 2018; De Magalhaes et al., 2019). Accordingly, understanding the main 
difference between life insurance and other insurance schemes (e.g. non-life insurance) is 
important in elucidating the findings. In essence, life insurance works as savings and is a way 
for the rich to accumulate assets. This is relevant because, given that there are savings 
constraints, life insurance provides a way of slackening these savings constraints. Hence, the 
results that life insurance increases inequality is broadly consistent with studies supporting the 
perspective that life insurance is used by the rich to accumulate assets (De Magalhaes & 
Santaeulalia 2018; Dupas & Robinson, 2018) and, by extension, ceteris paribus, the 
accumulation of more wealth by the rich naturally increases income inequality. Moreover, the 
findings that non-life insurance decreases inequality is traceable to perspective of non-life 
insurance smoothing consumption over the lifecycle (De Magalhaes et al., 2019). This 
clarification on non-life insurance should also be understood in the perspective that since most 
of the sampled countries are poor countries, informal forms of savings or insurance are quite 
substantial (Carroll, 1997; Kaplan & Violante, 2010) even to consumption and income 
distributions in such poor economies (Ligon et al., 2002).  
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5. Conclusion and future research directions 
  
 In order to complement the extant literature on insurance penetration in sub-Saharan 
Africa, this study has investigated how inequality is affected by insurance penetration. 
Contingent on data availability constraints at the time of the study, the research examines a 
panel of 42 countries in the sub-region over the period 2004-2014.  Three inequality variables 
(i.e. the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio) and two insurance premiums 
(i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance) are used for the purpose of the study. The GMM is 
used as empirical strategy. The findings show that life insurance has a positive impact on the 
Gini coefficient while increasing life insurance induces a positive overall incidence on both 
the Atkinson index and the Gini coefficient. The incidence of non-life insurance on the Gini 
coefficient is negative and boosting non-life insurance leads to an overall net positive impact 
on the Palma ratio. 
 In order to provide the room for policy implications, the study is extended by 
establishing critical masses at which boosting insurance can completely eliminate the overall 
positive net impacts on inequality. The extended analyses show that a threshold of 7.500 life 
insurance premiums (% of GDP) is required for life insurance to affect inequality negatively, 
whereas a threshold of 0.855 non-life insurance premiums (% of GDP) is needed for non-life 
insurance to negatively impact inequality. These thresholds make economic sense and have 
policy relevance because they are within the acceptable ranges of life and non-life insurance. 
 Future studies can use relevant empirical strategies to established country-specific 
policy thresholds. This recommendation is motivated by the fact that country-specific cases 
are eliminated from the GMM specification in order to control for endogeneity.  
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Table 1: Inequality and Life Insurance   
       
 Dependent variable: Inequality dynamics   
 
   
 Gini Coefficient  Atkinson Index Palma Ratio 
       
Constant  0.012 0.055*** -0.012 0.022* 0.098 0.248** 
 (0.470) (0.000) (0.570) (0.067) (0.678) (0.023) 
Gini  Coefficient (-1) 0.986*** 0.926*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Atkinson Index (-1) --- --- 1.031*** 0.990*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Palma Ratio(-1) --- --- --- --- 1.054*** 1.022*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Life Insurance (LI) 0.002* 0.003** 0.0003 0.003* -0.017 0.035 
 (0.086) (0.037) (0.779) (0.097) (0.631) (0.424) 
LI×LI --- -0.0002**  -0.0002** --- -0.001 
  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.613) 
Financial Depth  -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.011** -0.010*** 
 (0.491) (0.000) (0.247) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
Remittances  -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.00005 -0.00002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.823) (0.745) (0.736) (0.596) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  na 0.0026 na 0.0026 na na 
AR(1) (0.093) (0.098) (0.095) (0.076) (0.095) (0.092) 
AR(2) (0.217) (0.197) (0.835) (0.845) (0.392) (0.385) 
Sargan OIR (0.876) (0.926) (0.025) (0.035) (0.407) (0.374) 
Hansen OIR (0.883) (0.344) (0.725) (0.180) (0.812) (0.352) 
       
DHT for instruments 
      
(a)Instruments in levels 
      
H excluding group (0.719) (0.623) (0.567) (0.643) (0.623) (0.696) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.812) (0.215) (0.677) (0.085) (0.762) (0.195) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) 
      
H excluding group (0.910) (0.809) (0.725) (0.936) (0.574) (0.833) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.679) (0.115) (0.569) (0.024) (0.793) (0.111) 
       
Fisher  5244.31*** 105832.47*** 4256.60*** 235044.14*** 2507.20*** 79103.27*** 
Instruments  28 32 28 32 28 32 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  261 261 261 261 261 261 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean of Life Insurance is 0.881. na: not applicable because at least one  
estimated coefficient necessary for the computation of the net effect is not significant. 
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Table 2: Inequality and Non-Life Insurance   
       
 Dependent variable: Inequality dynamics   
 
   
 Gini Coefficient  Atkinson Index Palma Ratio 
       
Constant  0.052*** 0.025** -0.010 -0.015 0.654** -0.021 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.719) (0.303) (0.011) (0.931) 
Gini  Coefficient (-1) 0.927*** 0.963*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)     
Atkinson Index (-1) --- --- 1.043*** 1.036*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Palma Ratio(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.974*** 1.049*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Non Life Insurance (NLI) -0.005* 0.008 -0.010 0.017 -0.054 0.761** 
 (0.083) (0.407) (0.109) (0.295) (0.824) (0.028) 
NLI×NLI --- -0.006 --- -0.013** --- -0.445*** 
  (0.115)  (0.032)  (0.003) 
Financial Depth  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003** -0.016*** -0.016** 
 (0.108) (0.139) (0.118) (0.019) (0.007) (0.000) 
Remittances  0.0002 -0.0002*** 0.0003 0.0002 0.033* 0.011** 
 (0.103) (0.007) (0.547) (0.400) (0.064) (0.048) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  na na na na na 0.0587 
AR(1) (0.100) (0.098) (0.087) (0.085) (0.098) (0.097) 
AR(2) (0.237) (0.220) (0.943) (0.966) (0.432) (0.455) 
Sargan OIR (0.873) (0.879) (0.041) (0.039) (0.655) (0.606) 
Hansen OIR (0.749) (0.674) (0.863) (0.951) (0.472) (0.727) 
       
DHT for instruments 
      
(a)Instruments in levels 
      
H excluding group (0.669) (0.708) (0.594) (0.658) (0.427) (0.585) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.640) (0.518) (0.853) (0.953) (0.456) (0.673) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) 
      
H excluding group (0.505) (0.449) (0.455) (0.736) (0.253) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.754) (0.734) (0.924) (0.944) (0.626) (0.788) 
       
Fisher  1251.46*** 9467.04*** 326.19*** 2503.93*** 531.59*** 1936.34*** 
Instruments  28 32 28 32 28 32 
Countries  36 36 36 36 36 36 
Observations  279 279 279 279 279 279 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The mean of Non Life Insurance is 0.798. na: not applicable because at least 
one  estimated coefficient necessary for the computation of the net effect is not significant.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
 
 
Income Inequality  
Gini 
Coefficient  
“The Gini coefficient is a measurement of the income 
distribution of a country's residents”. 
GCIP 
   
Atkinson 
Index 
“The Atkinson index measures inequality 
bydetermining which end of the distribution 
contributed most to the observed inequality”. 
GCIP 
   
Palma Ratio “The Palma ratio is defined as the ratio of the richest 
10% of the population's share of gross national income 
divided by the poorest 40%'s share”. 
GCIP 
    
Insurance  LifeIns Life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
   
NonLifeIns Non-life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Financial Depth   FinD Money Supply (% of GDP) FDSD 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank. GCIP: Global Consumption and Income Project. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Gini Coefficient   0.586 0.034 0.488 0.851 461 
Atkinson Index  0.705 0.058 0.509 0.834 461 
Palma Ratio  6.457 1.477 3.015 14.434 461 
Life Insurance  0.881 2.126 0.0006 12.220 346 
Non Life Insurance   0.798 0.536 0.005 2.774 367 
Financial Depth   32.022 19.431 4.383 99.958 440 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3:Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 342) 
        
Gini Atkinson Palma LifeIns NonLifeIns Fin.D Remit  
1.000 0.857 0.952 0.038 0.084 -0.249 0.010 Gini 
 1.000 0.925 0.028 0.159 -0.212 0.159 Atkinson 
  1.000 0.055 0.112 -0.226 0.079 Palma 
   1.000 0.747 0.186 -0.019 LifeIns 
    1.000 0.517 0.156 NonLifeIns 
     1.000 0.131 Fin.D 
      1.000 Remit 
        
Gini :the Gini Coefficient. Atkinson :the Atkinson Index. Palma: the Palma Ratio. LifeIns: Life Insurance. NonLifeIns: Non 
Life Insurance. Fin.D: Financial Depth. Remit: Remittances. 
 
 
